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Abstract
Background: Interest in advance directives in mental health care is growing internationally.
There is no clear universal agreement as to what such an advance directive is or how it should
function.
Aim: To describe the range of issues embodied in the development of advance directives in
mental health care.
Method: The literature on advance directives is examined to highlight the pros and cons of
diﬀerent versions of advance directive.
Results: Themes emerged around issues of terminology, competency and consent, the legal
status of advance directives independent or collaborative directives and their content.
Opinions vary between a unilateral legally enforceable instrument to a care plan agreed
between patient and clinician.
Conclusion: There is immediate appeal in a liberal democracy that values individual freedom
and autonomy in giving weight to advance directives in mental health care. They do not,
however, solve all the problems of enforced treatment and early access to treatment. They also
raise new issues and highlight persistent problems.
Declaration of interest: The research was funded by the Nuﬃeld Foundation grant number
MNH/00015G.
Introduction
Interest in advance directives in mental
health in Britain has been stimulated by
the planned reform of mental health
legislation in both England & Wales
(Department of Health, 1999a; Depart-
ment of Health & Home Oﬃce, 2000)
and Scotland (Scottish Executive, 2001a
& b). Versions of advance directives have
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appeared in Bills before Parliament in
both countries (Department of Health,
2002; Scottish Parliament, 2002). Pre-
viously the main interest in the UK was
through some of the voluntary organiza-
tions which either proposed them (e.g.
Manic Depression Fellowship), or recog-
nized that their members were interested
in them (e.g. National Schizophrenia
Fellowship, National Schizophrenia Fel-
lowship (Scotland), MIND). The Na-
tional Institute for Clinical Excellence
(NICE) has recommended the use of
advance directives in relation to the use
of atypical anti-psychotic drugs (NICE,
2002). The Health Technology Board for
Scotland advises the use of advance
statements in its advice on the same
group of drugs (Health Technology
Board for Scotland, 2002).
The United States has the longest
history of their use and an evolved legal
framework for managing them. Since,
however, mental health legislation in
relation to involuntary detention is a
state responsibility, each state has its
own, often diﬀerent legislation. The US
Patient Self-Determination Act of 1990
put a duty on all federally funded health
care institutions to notify patients of
their right to make advance directives
for health care decisions or to appoint
health care attorneys and to assist them
in deciding whether to make such a
directive (Pellegrino, 1992; Kapp, 1994).
The international literature on advance
planning in mental health care makes
frequent references to ‘advance direc-
tives’ in many guises to solve a variety
of problems in patient management,
including the suggestion that advance
directives could be used to allow a person
to participate in research even when they
are incapable of consenting at the time
(American Psychiatric Association, 1995;
Backlar, 1998). Rarely, however, are the
details of what is envisaged spelt out.
Advance directives are generally pro-
posed as a way of increasing patient
autonomy, one of the four basic princi-
ples traditionally viewed as underpinning
medical ethics (e.g. Beauchamp & Child-
ress, 1983; Downie & Calman, 1987).
Indeed it has been argued that autonomy
has become the most important principle
in bioethics in America (Wolfe, 1998).
O’Neill (2002), however, has argued that
as traditionally constructed in medical
ethics, autonomy amounts to little more
than ‘informed consent’. Furthermore,
she suggests there are ‘systematic limita-
tions’ to informed consent as it is ‘always
given to one or another description of a
proposal for treatment.’ (p. 43). If
advance directives are seen as an expres-
sion of individual choice, no matter how
circumscribed that choice may be, there
is no problem in locating them in the
traditional view of individual autonomy
in medical ethics. The limitations of
contemporary choice are merely echoed
in planning for the future. Likewise, her
preferred concept of ‘principled autono-
my’ which requires principles that ‘can be
adapted by any, hence by all, ordinary
agents’ (p. 88) can accommodate advance
directives since there is no reason why
they could not be adapted by all. This
might be deemed to be the position of the
United States in respect of its 1990 Act.
This paper seeks to discuss the main
areas for consideration in the formal
involvement of advance directives in
mental health services. It will do this by
ﬁrst reporting the varieties of advance
directives and their terminology currently
described in the literature, and then
looking at the main issues arising from
this, namely their legal status and the
breadth of their remit. Although passing
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reference will be made to potential
impact on resources, this is not a major
focus of the paper and has been discussed
elsewhere (Halpern & Szmukler, 1997;
Chan & Conacher, 1994; Brown, 1995).
Concepts and terminology
All forms of advance directive have the
aim of specifying a person’s wishes when
they are ‘well’ (capable) for what they
want to happen when they are ‘ill’
(incapable) and unable to make deci-
sions. A variety of terms are used in the
literature, including ‘advance refusal’,
‘Ulysses contract’, ‘advance agreement’,
‘advance statement’ and the less common
‘psychiatric will’ and ‘Mill’s will’. These
are not always clearly deﬁned and there is
no guarantee that the same term has a
consistent meaning. Although all terms
refer to planning the future management
of an illness episode they reﬂect diﬀerent
types of relationship between service
users and service providers. This may
reﬂect diﬀerent assumptions about what
they should do, or be an eﬀect of
diﬀerent cultures or health services.
‘Advance refusals’ allow a patient to
opt out of treatment. In contrast, the
‘Odysseus/Ulysses contract’ or ‘self-bind-
ing contract’ allows a patient to opt-in to
services (Howell et al., 1982; Dresser,
1984). A patient agrees in advance that
they want services or medication when
they are ill, even if at the time they refuse
because of the illness. A self-binding
contract could be used to specify where
a patient will accept treatment (Bazelon
Centre, 1999). This may be possible in
countries with private health insurance
but is unlikely to be acceptable in the
UK.
‘Advance agreement’, the term pre-
ferred in the English review of legislation,
(Department of Health & Home Oﬃce,
2000) implies that decisions are taken
with clinicians and, crucially, agreed with
them. This can be seen as a limit to
patient autonomy. An ‘advance directive’
(Halpern & Szmukler, 1997; Dawson et
al., 2001) on the other hand, might be
seen as the embodiment of autonomy, in
that they direct the clinician and their
choices, and this may be considered to be
stronger than an ‘advance statement’, the
term preferred by the Scottish Executive
(Scottish Executive, 2001b) whereby a
choice is stated.
The term ‘psychiatric will’ was coined
by Szasz (1982a) who, as a consequence
of arguing that psychiatric treatment is
oppression, argues for a legally binding
document which prohibits compulsory
treatment under mental health law. It is
thus similar to advance refusal. He
argues against compulsory treatment
under any circumstances, preferring ‘in-
formal moral sanction such as social
ostracism or divorce and formal judicial
sanctions such as ﬁne and imprisonment’.
(Szasz, 1982b)
‘Mill’s wills’, named after the philoso-
pher John Stuart Mill, have been argued
for by Rogers and Centifanti (1991) as a
limit to paternalism and to allow the
person to opt into or out of speciﬁc
treatments. Mill argues that the ‘only
purpose for which power can be right-
fully exercised over any member of a
civilized community against his will is to
prevent harm to others. His own good,
either physical or moral is not a suﬃcient
warrant.’ (Mill 1859/1969).
Linked to the concept of future plan-
ning are ‘joint crisis plans’ (Sutherby et
al., 1999) which require the individual to
be a current user of services and to make
plans in collaboration and agreement
with their service provider.
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‘Crisis cards’ are more like an advance
directive which does not require the
agreement of a service provider. Suther-
by & Szmukler (1998) attribute their ﬁrst
use to Survivors Speak Out in England in
1989. This group also promoted their use
during the debate in the UK on compul-
sory community treatment in 1998.
Other ways of determining patients’
views and wishes have been explored.
For example a ‘values history’ seeks to
explore the person’s value system to
allow substituted judgments to be made
using this as their basis (Lambert et al.,
1990). Proxy decision makers can make
judgements on either a ‘best interests’ or
‘substituted judgement’ basis. The ap-
proach intended should be stated at the
outset.
Several of the state laws in America
which relate to advance directives have
an important role for proxy decision
makers (Sales, 1993; Fleishner, 1998)
and allow the nomination of an ‘endur-
ing power of attorney’ (Gallagher, 1998).
Some states explicitly prohibit the per-
son’s consultant psychiatrist or other
clinician from whom they are receiving
treatment from becoming a proxy. The
expectation appears to be that the proxy
will be a family member or friend.
The Adults with Incapacity (Scotland)
Act 2000 has created a new ‘welfare
power of attorney’ allowing the attorney
to take medical and other decisions for
an adult who has lost capacity. Similar
provisions are contained in the Ontario
Health Care Consent Act 1996 and
Substituted Decisions Act 1992.
The potential variety of advance direc-
tives can be illustrated by locating a
hypothetical advance directive in at least
three dimensions: (i) its legal status, (ii)
whether it is independently or collabora-
tively made and (iii) what interventions it
may cover (including opt in and opt out
of treatment). Plotting these dimensions
as in Table 1 gives 32 potential types of
advance directives. A fourth dimension,
patient status, voluntary or detained, in-
patient or community-based adds further
potential varieties of advance directive
and highlights the importance of clarify-
ing what is intended when promoting
advance planning.
Competency and consent
Before discussing the concerns in-
volved in giving legal status to advance
directives, the issue of competency to
make such a directive must be addressed.
As with any other form of future plan-
ning, be it a ‘living will’ or ‘last will and
testament’, the person doing the planning
must be competent. The issues involved
in measuring competency are extensive,
beyond the scope of this paper, and
reviewed elsewhere (Gunn, 1994; Roth
et al., 1977; Atkinson & Patterson, 2001).
Gunn (1994) suggests that for mental
health decisions cognitive tests are not
always enough and that in addition the
person must be able to ‘appreciate the
treatment and its consequences.’ The
English courts have said that the person
must ‘believe’ the information given and
be able to make a ‘true choice’ (Re C,
1994). A mental illness may prevent this.
A number of American States have
criteria laid down to measure compe-
tency but again these vary from state to
state (Atkinson & Patterson, 2001).
It is not just how competency is
measured which is important, but the
surrounding issues of who makes the
judgement as to competency, and when
and where it is made. Central will be the
questions of whether this is a legal or
clinical judgement and the form any
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competency hearing takes. These will
have resource implications, which may
be greater if the advance directive is
legally binding. There is also the related
issue of who pays the legal costs of
making, changing, invoking or challen-
ging the use of an advance directive. If
the costs fall to the individual then it is
likely to exclude signiﬁcant numbers of
those with severe and enduring mental
illness who might otherwise wish to make
them.
Financial assistance may be made
available for such cases but then we must
consider the source of such aid. It is
unlikely that hard-pressed clinical ser-
vices will want their resources directed to
this. Even insurance premiums for clin-
icians might increase if there is concern
about the increased possibility of litiga-
tion. The reviews of the Mental Health
Acts in both England & Wales and
Scotland (Department of Health &
Home Oﬃce, 2000; Scottish Executive,
2001b), although advocating advance
directives in some form, do not deal with
diﬃculties surrounding resource or fund-
ing issues.
The President’s Commission (1983)
argued that assessing capacity need not
be unduly onerous. An ‘informed layper-
son’ should be able to make an assess-
ment as to whether the patient
understands the situation and can ‘make
a choice in the light of that understand-
ing.’ The judge who would make the
decision would do so as a layperson,
albeit on the basis of medical advice.
Most legal jurisdictions will imply a
presumption of capacity. A doctor who
ignored an advance directive could not
defend a charge of battery (assault) by
arguing he did not know whether the
patient had been competent to make the
directive (Malette v. Shulman, 1990).T
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However, if a person has a pre-existing
mental illness it will be more diﬃcult for
health care professionals to rely on the
presumption of capacity.
Inherent in the notion of competency is
that the person understands the issues
involved. ‘Informed consent’ is the term
used in American states but not, surpris-
ingly, a concept known to UK law. In the
context of ‘living wills’ or advance
directives relating to end of life decisions,
there has been some discussion of the
amount of information the patient
should have to allow a valid decision to
be made. Dresser (1995) argues, for
example, that planning for future demen-
tia requires a sophisticated understand-
ing of the options for care and treatment.
We are not aware of similar discussions
relating to the information needs of
patients wishing to make advance state-
ments in psychiatry.
In general medicine a person can make,
when competent, an advance directive
refusing a potentially life saving proce-
dure for what may seem to others
irrational reasons (Re T, 1992; Sidaway
v. Royal Bethlem Governors, 1985). For
mental health law to be consistent a
competent patient would have to be able
to refuse, for example, Electro Convulsive
Therapy (ECT) for apparently irrational
reasons, even if these stemmed from
misconceptions about the procedure.
Many tests of competency and informed
consent require that the person be able to
show that they understand the nature and
purpose of the treatment. It is generally
accepted in UK law that a higher
standard of actual knowledge and under-
standing is required for a refusal to be
valid (Re T, 1992). Moreover, if apparent
‘irrationality’ could be the result of
mental illness, this has to be taken into
account. Contrast two American cases
where in one a patient’s delusions pre-
vented her from appreciating the facts of
the case (Re Maida Yetter, 1973) while in
the other the refusal of treatment by a
woman with a degree of dementia was
respected, notwithstanding that her rea-
sons were not regarded as medically
rational (Lane v. Candura, 1978).
If a person has to be competent to
make an advance directive, the question
arises whether they also have to be
competent to change it. It is generally
assumed that advance refusals for treat-
ment in end of life situations will be
waived if the patient, even if not deemed
competent, is giving indications that they
wish to live. There is legislation in the US
which allows revocation even after the
loss of capacity. In the UK, Age Concern
and the Centre of Medical Law and
Ethics (1988) argued that, despite the
apparent illogicality, that if a patient,
however confused, requested treatment,
it would be inhumane to refuse this on
the grounds that they had previously
made an advance directive refusing treat-
ment. If this is followed through in
advance directives in the mental health
context then the patient, competent or
not, should be able to accept treatment
even after an advance directive refusing
this. There is more of an issue however, if
a person who may now be incompetent is
allowed to refuse treatment that an opt-
in advance directive was speciﬁcally set
up to avoid them refusing. The Mental
Health Bill currently before the Scottish
Parliament will require a patient to be
competent to revoke an advance direc-
tive.
If we assume that the desire to live, no
matter how it is displayed, should out-
weigh any advance directive, then chan-
ging one’s mind in this direction should
not be a problem and the potentially
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terminal consequences of an advance
directive should be overruled. In mental
illnesses, particularly depression, the si-
tuation may be less clear. Depression, for
example, may make a person believe that
they do not deserve to live. While they
are ill their ability to change their mind
may be taken from them. What might be
seen as the ‘natural safeguard’ in a
person’s ﬁghting for life has been lost.
Legal status of advance directives
As previously noted, a number of
American states have laws relating to
advance directives in mental health care
(Fleishner, 1998). In Canada, the Ontario
Health Care Consent Act 1996 gives
statutory eﬀect to advance statements in
medicine, including psychiatry. The Eur-
opean Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine, signed by 29 European
states (excluding the UK), requires ad-
vance statements to be ‘taken into
account’ if a patient is not able to express
his or her wishes at the time medical
interventions are made (Article 9). In
England & Wales, in general medicine,
advance refusals of treatment have com-
mon law status (Airedale NHS Trust v.
Bland, 1993). The British Medical Asso-
ciation (1995) has advised doctors that
an ‘unambiguous and informed advance
refusal is as valid as a contemporaneous
refusal’ and doctors must comply with it.
The BMA gives no guidance on how the
doctor ascertains that the refusal is
‘informed’. An advance directive refusing
treatment would appear to be valid for a
voluntary patient refusing psychiatric
treatment or medical treatment, but the
refusal could be over-ruled if the patient
was detained under mental health legisla-
tion. Normally only treatment for the
mental illness can be enforced under this
legislation and only within the safeguards
of the legislation. Refusals of treatment
for physical illness will generally be
honoured unless the refusal was thought
to be a consequence of mental illness. In
a case in England, a man who had a
diagnosis of schizophrenia and was
described as ‘delusional’ nevertheless
had his refusal of treatment for life
threatening gangrene upheld by the
court, because it was satisﬁed that he
understood the ‘nature, purpose and
eﬀects’ of the treatment proposed for
him and had made a ‘clear choice’ to
refuse it (Re C, 1994).
The ability of the law to override
competently made decisions for detained
psychiatric patients can be seen as
discriminatory as already noted. The
Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act
2000 now speciﬁcally provides that pro-
fessionals ‘take account’ of statements,
however formulated. There is similar
provision in the Mental Health (Scot-
land) Bill (Scottish Parliament, 2002)
whereby psychiatrists and mental health
tribunals have to pay ‘due regard’ to
advance statements. Thus, for advance
directives in mental health, the crucial
legal issue is as much their relationship to
mental health law as their general legal
standing.
The legal standing of an advance
directive will aﬀect many of the decisions
taken; for example, proof of competency
procedures might be more rigorous for a
legally binding directive than one which
was seen as merely suggestive. To avoid
future litigation a competency hearing
might be required, with the problems
attendant in assessing competency to
make or change an advance directive.
There is also a question of how long
an advance directive should remain in
force. Again this might be more im-
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portant if it is legally binding, particu-
larly if it has been made by someone
with no experience of the illness or if
treatment options become available that
have not been envisaged. As Halpern &
Szmukler (1997) point out, a legally
binding advance directive might require,
as part of the competence to make it, a
discussion of its inherent ‘risks’. A non-
legally binding agreement, on the other
hand, might simply require a discussion
which emphasizes possible negative out-
comes.
If joint crisis plans are to become
legally binding advance directives, this
might change their nature. For example,
the proposals by Sutherby et al. (1999)
suggest that the plan involves, where
possible, an independent advocate in
addition to the mental health profes-
sionals, the patient and ‘anyone else who
might be helpful’. If one of the members
of this group were a lawyer we might
suspect that the nature of the discussion
would change. If the purpose is to
produce a formal, possibly legally bind-
ing document, there may arise occasions
where the views of the patient and staﬀ
diﬀer and agreement cannot be reached.
It is also likely that staﬀ would be
cautioned against writing into crisis plans
promises of certain services in case their
provision became problematic because of
limited resources. Service providers
might feel vulnerable to litigation if they
are unable to provide an agreed service at
an agreed time. Of course, in such a case
another debate might be opened about
what constitutes ‘agreed time’ and the
nature of the crisis. Thus, if advance
directives were legally binding, staﬀ, and
possibly patients, would have to be
cautious in their care planning to make
sure they were not inadvertently making
an advance directive. This might result in
a disclaimer on every care plan – ‘This is
not an advance directive’.
If advance directives were to be legally
binding, this would raise the very real
issue of whether they should permit
refusal of treatment, even if death ensued.
A directive might include refusal of
resuscitation after a suicide attempt or
allowing someone suﬀering from anorex-
ia to starve to death. In most cases to
allow someone to die through refusal of
treatment for a mental illness would mean
that mental health legislation could not
be used to overrule the advance directive.
Independent or collaborative
directives
If promoting or protecting a person’s
autonomy is the prime concern for
advance directives there is no reason
why the person needs to have experience
of mental illness when they make such a
directive (Szasz, 1982a). They will, how-
ever, of necessity be a patient when it is
invoked.
Some of the models for future plan-
ning, such as advance agreements and
joint crisis plans, are only appropriate for
those currently engaged with services.
Other forms of advance directives are,
however, available to people who have
not experienced the condition for which
they are planning. We need to consider if
there is any reason why people should
not be able to refuse, for example, ECT
even if they have no previous experience
of ECT or even severe depression. It is
possible to envisage a situation where it is
possible to make a less well informed
advance directive before any onset of
mental illness and without competency
being challenged, than it is after experi-
ence of both mental illness and speciﬁc
treatments when a more informed choice
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can be made but competency is more
likely to be challenged.
UK policy documents encourage
jointly negotiated decision making about
treatment and management (e.g. advance
agreements, joint crisis planning) as
leading to improvements in the patient-
clinician relationship, through greater
discussion between the parties, including
consideration of choices and statements
of preference. Patient autonomy, how-
ever, is only supported in so far as
preferences are accepted by staﬀ. The
Scottish Executive (2001b) promotes the
use of advance statements as supporting
‘the principle of participation’ (their
emphasis). They are not seen as altering
the legal relationships between service
users and service providers.
The English White Paper, ‘Reforming
the Mental Health Act’ (Department of
Health & Home Oﬃce, 2000) anticipated
advance agreements coming from people
who have already experienced care and
treatment for a serious mental disorder.
Clinical teams would be expected to help
patients make such statements and con-
sider them when planning treatment if
they are recent and made in consultation
with specialist mental health services.
The BMA (1995) shows how the distinc-
tion between advance directives and
good care planning can become almost
indistinguishable. They suggest ‘health
professionals have a key role in assisting
the patient to evaluate and reconcile the
advantages and disadvantages of the
treatment and make decisions about
future management accordingly. Antici-
patory statements authorizing treatment
or expressing preference between equally
viable treatments can be discussed at
times when the patient retains insight . . .
and these should be reﬂected in subse-
quent treatment plans . . .’.
What should advance directives cover?
As previously mentioned in relation to
table 1, there is a range of matters that
could potentially be covered by advance
directives including opting in or out of
medical treatment and instructions for
social, family and personal issues.
Opt-out options mean that the person
can refuse any, or all, psychiatric inter-
ventions. It is not possible to opt-out of
detention under mental health legisla-
tion, although some North American
states or provinces allow detained pa-
tients to refuse medication if not a danger
to others. Currently, in the UK, a
detained patient cannot opt-out of treat-
ment. The Millan Committee in Scotland
(Scottish Executive, 2001a) while not
recommending that detained patients be
allowed to refuse medication does re-
commend allowing competent patients to
refuse ECT, even if they are detained.
The main treatments which patients are
likely to want to refuse are all or speciﬁc
medication and ECT. One concern in
respect of refusals is not only that
patients limit what may be beneﬁcial to
them, but that there might be an increase
in detention if psychiatrists felt com-
pelled to detain patients who appeared to
accept proposed treatment which they
had previously rejected in an advance
directive. (Dawson et al., 2001). Pre-
viously such patients would have been
treated as voluntary patients. Concern
that their current agreement or change of
mind might not be competent could lead
to detention. This would protect psychia-
trists from litigation and provide the
patient with the protection of the review
procedures detailed in legislation. This
concern is based on the belief that
advance refusals have status in common
law which can be over-ridden by the
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Mental Health Act. As mentioned ear-
lier, in some circumstances honouring the
patient’s change of mind to accept
treatment, where this preserves their life
or health, might be seen as appropriate.
In those US states which have a
narrow committal criterion, for example
dangerousness only, opt-in advance di-
rectives have been seen as a potentially
useful way of gaining access to treatment
for a person who was becoming unwell
and refusing treatment but was not yet
legally detainable or, for those who do
not become dangerous but who would
otherwise be denied treatment. This
could be particularly useful for people
with a recurring condition, who when
well have good insight, but this is lost at
the onset of another episode. Such opt-
ins might reduce detentions for some
people, and thus the stigmatisation which
comes with detention, and give patients
some ownership of the admission pro-
cess. Under Scottish incapacity legisla-
tion a patient can request their attorney
to arrange for hospital admission. How-
ever, if they later resist admission when
ill, formal mental health act detention
procedures will have to be used. The
advance directive does not allow the use
of force or detention. The Ontario
legislation, on the other hand, allows an
appointed proxy to consent to involun-
tary detention in a psychiatric hospital,
provided that the document appointing
him or her gives that power.
Although the main focus for advance
directives has been on medical interven-
tions, there is some interest in extending
the scope of the directive to include other
aspects of the person’s life. Examples
include: specifying with whom the psy-
chiatrist or staﬀ may discuss the patient’s
case; removal of credit cards or other
measures to curtail overspending; ar-
rangements for child care; and naming
the person with whom staﬀ may liase to
maintain tenancy or other home agree-
ments (Manic Depression Fellowship,
2001; National Schizophrenia Fellow-
ship, 1999). At ﬁrst glance, these might
seem straightforward matters for ad-
vance directives to deal with. As with
medical care however each area would
necessitate careful consideration, not
least in its relationship to pre-existing
legislation governing credit and child-
care, for example. The same issues
relating to competency, information and
revocation as apply to medical treatment
would also have to be considered.
Conclusion
There is immediate appeal in a liberal
democracy that values individual free-
dom and autonomy in giving weight to
advance directives in mental health care.
This is especially so at a time when both
government and voluntary sector are
saying patients should have more control
over their psychiatric treatment. There
are, however, as we have indicated,
diﬃculties in incorporating advance di-
rectives into mental health law and
practice.
The Richardson Committee (Depart-
ment of Health, 1999a) was positive in its
assessment of what advance agreements
can achieve: ‘such agreements would
greatly assist in the promotion of infor-
mal and certainly consensual care. Pa-
tients and care teams would become used
to negotiating an agreed package of care
to be implemented in the case of relapse’.
As we have demonstrated, this is only
one version of what an advance directive
might be.
The legally binding model gives more
autonomy to the competent patient. Its
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application in practice would, of neces-
sity, be rather diﬀerent to the less formal
crisis plan. Advance directives could be
seen as having at least two diﬀerent aims.
On the one hand, there are legally
binding advance directives, particularly
relating to refusing treatment and prob-
ably not intended to be over-ruled by
mental health law. These might be seen
within the framework of legal restrictions
on the power of the psychiatrist, so that
patients have a more equal relationship
with psychiatrists. On the other hand,
there are crisis plan type arrangements
where the aim is to improve communica-
tion. Changes in the power relationship
may come more from increasing the
power of the patient, through giving
them information and a negotiating
framework, rather than restricting the
power of the psychiatrist. The emphasis
could be on changing patient behaviour
as much as the psychiatrist’s behaviour.
Far from being an easy solution to
ethical issues of enforced treatment and
early access to treatment, advance direc-
tives introduce new issues and highlight
persistent problems, not least regarding
the allocation of resources. This does not
mean, however, that advance planning
with patients is inappropriate. Anything
which allows patients and mental health
professionals to work more harmo-
niously together for the patients’ greater
good should be welcomed.
Postscript
Since writing this article the Scottish
parliament has passed The Mental Health
(Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act
2003 (Edinburgh: The Stationery Oﬃce).
Its provisions in relation to advance
statements are broadly similar to those
included in the Bill.
References
Age Concern & Centre of Medical Law and Ethics
Working Party Report (1988). The Living Will:
Consent to treatment at the end of life. London:
King’s College.
Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland [1993] AC 789 (HL).
American Psychiatric Association (1995). Opinions
of the Ethics Committee on the Principles of
Medical Ethics. Washington: American Psy-
chiatric Association.
Atkinson, J.M. & Patterson, L.E. (2001). Review
of Literature Relating to Mental Health Legis-
lation. Edinburgh: Scottish Executive.
Backlar, P. (1998). Ethics in community mental
health care: advance directives for subjects of
research who have ﬂuctuating cognitive im-
pairments due to psychotic disorders (such as
schizophrenia). Community Mental Health
Journal, 34, 229 – 240.
Bazelon Center (1999). Psychiatric Advance Di-
rective. http://www.bazelon.org/advdir.html.
Beauchamp, T.L. & Childress, J.F. (1983). Prin-
ciples of Bioethics. New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
British Medical Association (1995). Advance
Statements about Medical Treatment. London:
BMJ Publishing Group.
Brown, S.J. (1995). Advance directives move into
mental health care. Clinical Psychiatry News,
July 10 – 11.
Chan, M.P. & Conacher, G.N. (1994). Legally
untreatable – a new category of long stay
patient. Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, 39,
433 – 435.
Dawson, J., King, M., Papageorgiou, A. &
Davidson, O. (2001). Legal pitfalls of psychia-
tric research. The British Journal of Psychiatry,
178, 67 – 70.
Department of Health and Home Oﬃce (2000).
Reforming the Mental Health Act. London:
Department of Health and Home Oﬃce
2000.
Department of Health (1999a). Report of the
Expert Committee, Review of the Mental
Health Act. London: Department of Health.
Department of Health (2002). Draft Mental
Health Bill. London: HMSO.
Downie, R.S. & Calman, K.C. (1987). Healthy
Respect: Ethics in Health Care. London: Faber
and Faber.
Dresser, R. (1984). Bound to treatment: the
Ulysses contract. The Hastings Center Report,
14, June, 13 – 16.
For Evaluation Only.
Copyright (c) by Foxit Software Company, 2004 - 2007
Edited by Foxit PDF Editor
Dresser, R. (1995). Dworkin on dementia; elegant
theory, questionable policy. Hastings Center
Report, 25, June, 32 – 38.
Fleishner, R.D. (1998). Advance directives for
mental health care: An analysis of state
statutes. Psychology Public Policy and Law,
4, 788 – 804.
Gallagher, E.M. (1998). Advance directives for
psychiatric care: A theoretical and practical
overview for legal professionals. Psychology
Public Policy and Law, 4, 746 – 787.
Gunn, M. (1994). The meaning of incapacity.
Medical Law Review, 2, 8 – 29.
Halpern, A. & Szmukler, G. (1997). Psychiatric
advance directives: reconciling autonomy and
non-consensual treatment. Psychiatric Bulle-
tin, 21, 323 – 327.
Health Technology Board for Scotland (2002). The
use of newer (atypical) antipsychotic drugs for
the treatment of schizophrenia. Glasgow:HTBS.
Howell, T., Diamond, R.J. & Wikler, D. (1982). Is
there a case for voluntary commitment? In:
T.L. Beauchamp & L. Walters, (eds), Con-
temporary Issues in Bioethics. (pp. 163 – 157).
Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Kapp, M.B. (1994). Implications of the Patient
Self-determination Act for psychiatric prac-
tice. Hospital and Community Psychiatry, 45,
355 – 358.
Lambert, P., Mciver Gibson, J. & Nathanson, P.
(1990). The values history: An innovation in
surrogate medical decision-making. Law Med-
icine and Health Care, 18, 202 – 212.
Lane v. Candura (1978) 376 NE 2d 1232 (Mass
App Ct).
Malette v. Shulman (1990) 67 DLR (4th) 321,
[1991] 2 Med LR 162 (Ont CA).
Manic Depression Fellowship (2001). Planning
ahead for people with manic depression. Lon-
don: Manic Depression Fellowship.
Mill, J.S. (1859/1969). On Liberty. In:M.Warnock
(ed.) Utilitarianism. London: Collins/Fontana.
National Schizophrenia Fellowship (1999). Better
Act Now: NSF’s views on the Mental Health
Act Review. London: National Schizophrenia
Fellowship.
NICE (2002). Guidance in the use of newer
(atypical) antipsychotic drugs for the treatment
of schizophrenia. Technology Appraisal Gui-
dance No 43 London: NHS National Institute
for Clinical Excellence.
O’Neill, O. (2002).Autonomy andTrust in Bioethics.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pellegrino, E.D. (1992). Ethics. Journal of the
American Medical Association, 268, 354 – 356.
President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and
Behavioral Research (1983). Making Health
Care Decisions. Washington: US Government
Printing Oﬃce.
Re C (adult: refusal of medical treatment) [1994] 1
All ER 819 (Fam Div).
Re Maida Yetter (1973). 96 D & C 2d 619 (CP
Northampton County PA).
Re T (adult: refusal of treatment) [1992] 4 All ER
649 (CA).
Rogers, J.A. & Centifanti, J.B. (1991). Beyond
‘self-paternalism’: Response to Rosenson and
Kasten. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 17, 9 – 14.
Roth, L.H., Meisel, A. & Lidz, C.W. (1977). Tests
of Competency to Consent to Treatment.
American Journal of Psychiatry, 134, 279 – 284.
Sales, G.N. (1993). The health care proxy for
mental illness: can it work and should we want
it to? Bulletin of the American Academy
Psychiatry Law, 21, 161 – 179.
Scottish Executive (2001a). Report on the Review
of the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984.
Edinburgh: Scottish Executive.
Scottish Executive (2001b). Renewing Mental
Health Law Policy Statement. Edinburgh:
Scottish Executive.
Scottish Parliament (2002). Mental Health (Scot-
land) Bill. Edinburgh: Stationery Oﬃce.
Sidaway v. Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors
[1985] AC 871.
Sutherby, K., Szmukler, G.I., Halpern, A., Alex-
ander, M., Thornicroft, G., Johnson, C., &
Wright, S. (1999). A study of psychiatric ‘crisis
cards’ in a community psychiatric service. Acta
Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 100, 56 – 61.
Sutherby, K. & Szmukler, G. (1998). Crisis cards
and self help crisis initiatives. Psychiatric
Bulletin, 22, 4 – 7.
Szasz, T. (1982a). Involuntary Mental Hospitali-
zation: A crime against humanity. In: T.L.
Beauchamp & W. Leroy (eds), Contemporary
Issues in Bioethics. (pp. 148 – 153). Belmont,
CA: Wadsworth.
Szasz, T. (1982b). The psychiatric will. A new
mechanism for protecting persons against
‘psychosis’ and psychiatry. American Psychol-
ogist, 37, 762 – 770.
Wolfe, P.R. (1998). The triumph of autonomy in
American Bioethics: A sociological view. In:
R. Devries & J. Subed (eds), Bioethics and
Society: Constructing the Ethical Enterprise.
Englewood Cliﬀs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
For Evaluation Only.
Copyright (c) by Foxit Software Company, 2004 - 2007
Edited by Foxit PDF Editor
